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THE FAMOUS MARKS DOCTRINE:
CAN AND SHOULD WELL-KNOWN FOREIGN
MARKS RECEIVE TRADEMARK PROTECTION
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES?
1. INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property experts, practitioners, and students
recognize that part of the purpose of federal trademark law is to
protect the trademark owner's investment of time, energy, and
money that he or she has spent in presenting a product to the
public.' Additionally, trademark law protects the public from
deception and confusion, allowing the public to be "confident that,
in purchasing a product bearing a particular trademark which it
favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and
which it wants to get."2 The questions of how far this protection
extends, and to whom it is extended have been the subject of
litigation for decades, and has recently been particularly
scrutinized with respect to foreign trademark owners who wish to
assert trademark rights within the United States. In particular,
what, if any, level protection may a foreign trademark owner who
does not actually use his product within the United States expect
from American courts? Does the fame of his or her mark provide
any leverage in asserting those rights?
Some courts and scholars believe that federal trademark
protection is indeed extended to foreign mark owners who do not
use their marks within the United States via the "famous" or "well-
known" marks doctrine.' The famous marks doctrine stands for
1. S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), as reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274,
1275.
2. Id.
3. See Grupo Gigante S.A. De C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th
Cir. 2004) ("An absolute territoriality rule without a famous-mark exception
would promote consumer confusion and fraud."); see also J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 29:4
(4th ed. 2008) (stating that the famous marks doctrine is incorporated into
United States domestic law through Lanham Act §§ 43(a), 44(b), 44(h)). The
1
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the principle that "[i]f a mark used only on products or services
sold abroad is so famous that its reputation is known in the United
States, then that mark should be legally recognized in the United
States."'4  The famous marks doctrine, however, is not an
established rule of federal trademark law, but is rather the source
of heated debate among scholars and a split among the federal
circuits.
The doctrine has been addressed by two federal circuit courts of
appeal - the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit. In the 2004
case of Grupo Gigante v. Dallo, the Ninth Circuit recognized the
famous marks doctrine as an existing part of federal trademark
law.' However, the Second Circuit recently held that the famous
marks doctrine is not a part of existing federal trademark law in
ITC v. Punchgini, thereby creating the current circuit split.6
This comment analyzes the existence of the famous marks
doctrine in United States federal law. It will first provide a
background and history of the doctrine, from its origin to its
treatment by state and federal courts, as well as its place in
relevant international treaties and federal statutes. The comment
will then go on to summarize and analyze ITC, and discuss
whether the Second Circuit correctly held that the famous marks
doctrine is not currently a part of U.S. domestic trademark law.
Finally, the comment will address the wisdom of the famous marks
doctrine, whether and how it might be applied, and, ultimately, the
impact that the circuit split and the doctrine will have on trademark
law.
Lanham Act is "[a] federal trademark statute, enacted in 1946, that provides for
a national system of trademark registration and protects the owner of a federally
registered mark against the use of similar marks if any confusion might result or
if the strength of a strong mark would be diluted. The Lanham Act's scope is
independent of and concurrent with state common law." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 885 (7th ed. 1999). The Lanham Act is codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.
4. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 29:4.
5. Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1094.
6. ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 163 (2d Cir. 2007) ("[N]o
famous marks rights are independently afforded by the Lanham Act.").
146 [Vol. XIX: 145
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The General Doctrines of Territoriality and the Famous Marks
Doctrine
Trademark law has long endorsed the principle of
"territoriality," or the notion that a trademark has a separate legal
existence in each country in which it has a registered or legally
recognized right.7 In the strictest of terms, the owner of a foreign
mark has no rights to use that mark in the United States, or to
prevent others from using it absent use or registration in the United
States. 8
The territoriality principle of trademark law was first established
in the 1923 case of A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, where the
Supreme Court seemingly rejected the "universality" theory in
order to endorse territoriality.9  Territoriality, as originally
established, interpreted the function of a trademark as not solely an
indicator of the source of goods, but rather as a symbol of the
domestic goodwill of the domestic markholder so
that the consuming public may rely with an
expectation of consistency on the domestic
reputation earned for the mark by its owner, and the
owner of the mark may be confident that his
goodwill and reputation (the value of the mark) will
not be injured through use of the mark by others in
domestic commerce. 0
7. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 29:1 ("[A] trademark is recognized as having
a separate existence in each sovereign territory in which it is registered or
legally recognized as a mark." (citing Person's Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d
1565, 1568-1569 (Fed. Cir. 1990))).
8. Donald J. Prutzman, Non-U.S. Trademark Owners Should Consider
Protecting Trademarks in the U.S. Even if There is No Current U.S. Use, 19 No.
11 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 1,1 (2007).
9. A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 692 (1923). The "universality"
theory stood for the principle that a mark indicates the same source no matter
where the mark is being used in the world. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 29:1.
10. Am. Circuit Breaker Corp. v. Or. Breakers, Inc., 406 F.3d 577, 582 (9th
2008]
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As established, the territoriality principle is one that is "basic to
trademark law," in which trademark rights "exist in each country
solely according to that country's statutory scheme." "
Furthermore, the federal circuits have recognized that "it is well
settled that foreign use is ineffectual to create trademark rights in
the United States." 2
The territoriality principle, without more, severely limits the
foreign mark holder's right to trademark protection within the
United States because it requires that the owner of the mark either
register or use the mark in the United States before asserting
priority rights to the mark under federal law. 3  However, some
believe that the "famous marks" ("well known" or "famous
foreign" marks) doctrine is also recognized by United States
trademark law, and that this either negates the territoriality
principle or creates an exception to the rule of territoriality,
whereby a foreign mark, regardless of use or registration within
the United States, can obtain trademark protection as a result of the
mark having obtained fame or recognition within the United
States. '4
Unlike the territoriality principle, there is a great amount of
contention surrounding not only the validity of the famous marks
doctrine, but also its scope. As a result, there is no unilateral
treatment of the famous marks doctrine within the United States.
B. Federal and State Treatment of the Famous Marks Doctrine
The famous marks doctrine has not enjoyed great support by the
courts of the nation. Instead, the doctrine has been employed by
some, qualified by many, and flat-out denied by others.
Cir. 2005) (quoting Osawa v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1172 (S.D.N.Y.
1984)).
11. Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591,
599 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Ingenohl v. Walter E. Olsen & Co., 273 U.S. 541,
544 (1927)).
12. Id. (quoting La Societe Anonyme des Parfums Le Galion v. Jean Patou,
Inc., 495 F.2d 1265, 1270 n.4 (2d Cir. 1974)).
13. See Buti v. Impressa Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 1998)
(disregarding defendant's registration and use in Italy, and focusing on whether
the defendant used the mark in commerce in the United States).
14. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 29:61.
[Vol. XIX: 145
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1. State Common Law Unfair Competition and the Famous Marks
Doctrine
Prior to ITC, two New York state cases had been cited as the
first in the United States to address and endorse the famous marks
doctrine: Maison Prunier v. Prunier's Restaurant & Caf6, and
Vaudable v. Montmartre.5 While in actuality these cases rest on
the state law misappropriation theory of unfair competition, the
facts, analysis, and rationale of the cases embrace the spirit of the
famous marks doctrine, and had, for a very long time, been
thought to rest entirely on the famous marks doctrine.
In Maison Prunier, the owner of famous Parisian restaurant
"Maison Prunier", which had a branch in London but none in the
United States, sued the owners of a New York restaurant named
"Prunier's Restaurant and Caf6," who had not only adopted the
name and slogan of the famous French restaurant, but had also
advertised itself as "The Famous French Sea Food Restaurant."16
The New York court ruled in favor of the French plaintiff, first
finding authority under Article lObis of the Paris Convention, and
further ruling that "actual competition in a product is not essential
to relief under the doctrine of unfair competition."' 7  While the
court acknowledged the general rule of territoriality, it found that
there was an exception to the rule where the alleged infringer was
guilty of bad faith, and specified that the fame of the mark
involved was a relevant factor in determining whether the alleged
infringer had, in good faith, used the mark without knowing it had
been previously used by someone else. 8 The court found that
since the French restaurant trademark held wide repute, and
because the New York defendants had acted in bad faith, the
15. Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 193 N.Y.S.2d 332 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959);
Maison Prunier v. Prunier's Rest. & Caf6, 288 N.Y.S. 529 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1936).
16. Maison Prunier, 288 N.Y.S. at 530-31.
17. Id. at 532-533; see also Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, art. lObis, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1629, 828 U.N.T.S. 305
[hereinafter Paris Convention] (generally stating that countries of the Union are
required to provide nationals of other member countries effective protection
against unfair competition).
18. See Maison Prunier, 288 N.Y.S. at 536 ("The doctrine ... does not apply
where the second adopter is guilty of bad faith or where the use is made in such
a manner as to operate as a fraud on the public.").
2008]
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French plaintiff was entitled to trademark protection against unfair
competition, regardless of the fact that it did not operate any
establishments within the United States. 19
Two decades later, the New York state court once again granted
relief to a French plaintiff against a New York French restaurant in
Vaudable v. Montmartre.2" The New York defendants had
allegedly appropriated the name of the Parisian restaurant,
"Maxims," as well as its dcor and distinctive style of script
without consent.2' The court concluded that the French owners
had priority rights against the New York defendants by virtue of
(1) their uninterrupted use of the mark abroad, and (2) the fame of
the "Maxim's" mark among "the class of people residing in the
cosmopolitan city of New York who dine out. ' 22
2. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board and the Famous Marks
Doctrine
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board ("TTAB") first
addressed the famous marks doctrine in the 1983 decision of
Mother's Restaurants, Inc. v. Mother's Other Kitchen, Inc., where
the TTAB stated that:
[p]rior use and advertising of mark in connection
with goods or services marketed in foreign country
(whether that advertising occurs inside or outside
the United States) creates no priority rights in said
mark in the United States as against one who, in
good faith, has adopted the same or similar mark
for the same or similar goods or services in the
United States prior to the foreigner's first use of the
mark on goods or services sold and/or offered in the
United States, at least unless it can be shown that
the foreign party's mark was, at the time of the
adoption and first use of a similar mark by the first
19. Id. at 537.
20. See Vaudable, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
21. Seeid. at334.
22. Id. at 334-35.
150 [Vol. XIX: 145
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user in the United States, a "famous" mark.23
Shortly thereafter, the TTAB actually applied the famous marks
doctrine in All England Lawn Tennis Club, Ltd. v. Creations
Aromatiques, applying the same reasoning it had used in Mother's
Restaurants and ruling in the plaintiffs favor by barring
registration of a trademark for "Wimbledon Cologne" regardless
of the fact that the plaintiff was not using the Wimbledon mark on
any good marketed in the United States.24 Specifically, the TTAB
stated that the plaintiffs mark, "Wimbledon," had "acquired fame
and notoriety as used in association with the annual championships
within the meaning of Vaudable" and that "purchasers of
applicant's cologne would incorrectly believe that said product
was approved by or otherwise associated with the Wimbledon
tennis championships and that allowance of the application would
damage opposer's rights to the mark. 25
3. Federal Cases Addressing the Famous Marks Doctrine
The Second Circuit and Southern District of New York have
thrice before ITC encountered the famous marks doctrine, resulting
in only one definitive ruling by the district court on the issue.
In Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., the Second
Circuit refused to issue a ruling on the viability of the famous
marks doctrine, and instead resolved the case based on the fact that
the Cuban embargo barred the recognition of trademark rights.26
In Empresa Cubana, the plaintiff, Cubatabaco, a Cuban cigar
company, had a registered mark "Cohiba" for cigars in Cuba in
1969, and began selling "Cohiba" marked cigars. 27 Thereafter, the
plaintiff applied for and registered the "Cohiba" mark in several
other countries, but did not sell or register the mark within the
23. Mother's Rests., Inc. v. Mother's Other Kitchen, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1046, 1048 (T.T.A.B. 1983) (citation omitted).
24. See All Eng. Lawn Tennis Club, Ltd. v. Creations Aromatiques, 220
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1069, 1072 (T.T.A.B. 1983).
25. Id.
26. Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462, 465 (2d Cir.
2005).
27. Id.
2008]
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United States due to the Cuban trade embargo.28 Meanwhile, in
1981, General Cigar, a United States company, registered the
"Cohiba" mark in the United States.29 After periods of non-use in
the United States by the American company General Cigar,
Cubatabaco argued that General Cigar had abandoned its United
States trademark and that Cubatabaco's "Cohiba" mark had gained
fame thereafter."°
The district court in Empresa held that there was indeed an
action for famous foreign marks, which was to be determined by
analyzing whether the mark had obtained secondary meaning.31
Finding that Cubatabaco's "Cohiba" mark had obtained secondary
meaning, and thus fame, the district court applied the famous
marks doctrine and held that Cubatabaco's mark held priority over
General Cigar's mark.32 The Second Circuit reversed the ruling of
the district court, finding that the Cuban trade embargo barred
trademark rights in Cuban goods.33 The Second Circuit did,
however, comment that Cubatabaco may have been right that
"Sections 44(b) and (h) [of the Lanham Act] incorporate Article
6bis and allow foreign entities to acquire U.S. trademark rights in
the United States if their marks are sufficiently famous in the
United States before they are used in this country."34 Regardless,
the Second Circuit refused to dispose of the issue in Empresa
Cubana.
The Southern District of New York was once again confronted
with the famous marks doctrine in De Beers LV Trademark Ltd. v.
DeBeers Diamond Syndicate.35 The plaintiff, De Beers, had the
rights to the "De Beers" mark in the United States and abroad, but
had not sold any products or services in the United States.3 6 The
28. Id.
29. Id. at 465-66.
30. Id. at 464.
31. Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 97 Civ. 8399(RWS), 2004
WL 602295, at *34 (S.D.N.Y. March 26, 2004)
32. Id. at *52.
33. Empresa, 399 F.3d at 472.
34. Id. at 480.
35. De Beers LV Trademark Ltd. v. DeBeers Diamond Syndicate, Inc., 440
F. Supp. 2d 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
36. See De Beers LV Trademark Ltd. v. DeBeers Diamond Syndicate, Inc.,
No. 04 CIV.4099(DLC), 2005 WL 1164073, at * 1 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2005).
[ ol. XIX: 145
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defendant, DeBeers, had incorporated in 1981, became inoperative
in 1986, and filed for a certificate of renewal and registered
"DeBeers Diamond Syndicate."37 The plaintiffs filed an action for
unfair competition under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, alleging
that they had priority rights to the "De Beers" mark under the
famous marks doctrine.38 The Southern District of New York
recognized the famous marks doctrine and spoke to the import of
regulating trademarks in the global economy.39 However, while
the court stated that the famous marks doctrine may be applicable
in appropriate cases, barring contravening authority from the
Second Circuit, it did not issue a decision on whether the famous
marks doctrine applied to the De Beers case.4"
The Southern District of New York was faced once again with
the issue of the famous marks doctrine in Almacenes Exito S.A. v.
El Gallo Meat Market." The plaintiff, Almacenes Exito, owned a
large chain of retail stores operating in Columbia and Venezuela
under the name "Exito," with sales exceeding $700,000,000 in
1999.42 The plaintiffs "Exito" mark had become well-known to
the point that a high percentage of Latinos in New York City
recognized the mark.43  Meanwhile, the defendants operated
markets in Manhattan and the Bronx under the name of "Exito,"
and used an exact replica of Almacenes Exito's mark.44
This time, the Southern District of New York explicitly rejected
the famous marks doctrine because it had not been expressly
codified in the Lanham Act.45 Specifically, the district court
37. De Beers, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 262-63.
38. Id. at 265.
39. Id. at 269 ("[S]ignificant prudential considerations augur in favor of
recognizing the [famous marks] doctrine. As a result, it would be applied here
if appropriate.").
40. See id. at 272.
41. Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Market, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d
324 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
42. Id. at 326.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 327 ("To the extent the doctrine is a creature of common law it
may support state causes of action, but it has no place in federal law where
Congress has enacted a statute, the Lanham Act, that carefully prescribes the
bases for federal trademark claims.").
20081
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followed the dicta in Empresa Cubana, holding that the Paris
Convention does not create additional substantive rights within the
Lanham Act. 46  The court held that any implementation of the
famous marks doctrine must come from Congress itself.47
ITC was only the second federal circuit court to rule on the
viability of the famous marks doctrine. The Second Circuit's
decision denouncing the famous marks doctrine as outside the
Lanham Act brought it into direct confrontation with a recent
Ninth Circuit opinion. In Grupo Gigante S.A. De C. V. v. Dallo &
Co., the Ninth Circuit specifically endorsed the famous marks
doctrine as a matter of public policy. 48
Grupo Gigante involved a dispute between a Mexican chain of
grocery stores operating under the name "Gigante" and an
American chain of grocery stores in Southern California, also
operating under the name "Gigante."49 The owners of the Mexican
chain sued the owners of the Southern California chain, claiming,
among other things, unfair competition under state law and the
Lanham Act, as well as improper use of a well-known mark under
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention.5" While the Ninth Circuit
rejected a conclusion that the defendants had violated any articles
46. Id. at 328.
47. Exito, 381 F.Supp.2d at 328 ("[S]uch a radical change in basic federal
trademark law may... only be made by Congress, not the courts.").
48. Grupo Gigante S.A. De C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th
Cir. 2004).
49. Id. at 1091.
50. Id. at 1092. The plaintiffs brought claims under the following actions:
(1) improper use of a well-known mark, under
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention; (2) unfair
competition , under Article 10bis of the Paris
Convention; (3) trademark infringement, under §
43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); (4)
false designation of origin, misrepresentation, and
unfair competition, under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); (5) violation of the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1996, 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c); (6) common law unfair competition; (7)
unfair competition under California law; (8) dilution
under California law; and (9) common law
misappropriation.
Id. at 1092 n.3.
[Vol. XIX: 145
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of the Paris Convention, it did hold that the famous marks doctrine
did indeed apply to federal trademark actions." Specifically, the
Ninth Circuit ruled that "an absolute territoriality rule without a
famous marks exception would promote consumer confusion and
fraud."52 The Ninth Circuit noted that
[c]ommerce crosses borders. In this nation of
immigrants, so do people. Trademark is, at its core,
about protecting against consumer confusion and
"palming off." There can be no justification for
using a trademark to fool immigrants into thinking
that they are buying from the store they liked back
home.53
The Ninth Circuit established a test to guide district courts in
evaluating the application of the famous marks exception to the
territoriality rule. 4 District courts must first determine whether
the mark satisfies the secondary meaning test.5 Secondly, where
the mark has not before been used in the American market, the
plaintiff must sufficiently establish, based on a preponderance of
the evidence, that "a substantial percentage of consumers in the
relevant American market is familiar with the foreign mark."56
Because the purpose of the famous marks doctrine is to prevent
consumer confusion and fraud, under the reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit, district courts "should consider such factors as the
intentional copying of the mark by the defendant, and whether
customers of the American firm are likely to think they are
51. Id. at 1100.
52. Id. at 1094.
53. Id.
54. Grupo, 391 F.3d at 1098.
55. Id. The concept of "secondary meaning" in trademark law refers to a
mark's actual ability to trigger in the consumers' minds a link between the
product or service and the source of that product or service. A mark has
secondary meaning when, in the minds of the public, the primary significance of
the mark is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself.
See id at 1095.
56. Id. at 1098. The court defined the relevant American market as the
"geographic area where the defendant uses the alleged infringing mark." Id.
2008]
11
Zobel: The Famous Marks Doctrine: Can and Should Well-Known Foreign Mark
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J ART, TECH & IP LAW
patronizing the same firm that uses the mark in another country. 57
C. The Famous Marks Doctrine in International Treaties and the
Lanham Act
1. The Paris Convention
The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
("Paris Convention") is the birthplace of the famous marks
doctrine. Specifically, Article 6bis of the Paris Convention
requires member states
ex officio if their legislation so permits, or at the
request of an interested party, to refuse or to cancel
the registration, and to prohibit the use, of a
trademark which constitutes a reproduction, an
imitation, or a translation, liable to create
confusion, of a mark considered by competent
authority of the country of registration or use to be
well known in that country as being already the
mark of a person entitled to the benefits of this
Convention and used for identical or similar goods.
These provisions shall also apply when the essential
part of the mark constitutes a reproduction of any
such well-known mark or an imitation liable to
create confusion therewith.8
Furthermore, Article lObis of the Paris Convention states that
member states are "bound to assure to nationals of such countries
effective protection against unfair competition."59 While there is
some debate, most of the authorities, including the Eleventh
Circuit in International Cafi6 v. Hard Rock Caft, view the Paris
Convention as a non-self-executing treaty, requiring positive
legislation in order to become effective under domestic law.6"
57. Id.
58. Paris Convention, supra note 17, art. 6bis.
59. Id. art. l0bis.
60. See Int'l Caf6, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Caf6 Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d
156 [Vol. XIX: 145
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2. Section 44 of the Lanham Act
Much of the confusion over the validity of the famous marks
doctrine comes from the ambiguity of section 44 of the Lanham
Act. While there has been no debate that the Paris Convention has
been made effective through legislation by Congress, there has
been some debate concerning whether or not section 44 only
partially incorporates the Paris Convention, or whether, in fact, the
Paris Convention is fully embodied within section 44, thereby
creating substantive provisions parallel to those found within the
Paris Convention treaty.61
For purposes of the famous marks doctrine, courts and
commentators have looked to sections 44(b) and 44(h) of the
Lanham Act to either support or deny the validity of the doctrine.
Specifically, section 44(b) states that
[a]ny person whose country of origin is a party to
any convention or treaty relating to trademarks,
trade or commercial names, or the repression of
unfair competition, to which the United States is
also a party, or extends reciprocal rights to nationals
of the United States by law, shall be entitled to the
benefits of this section under the conditions
expressed herein to the extent necessary to give
effect to any provision of such convention, treaty or
reciprocal law, in addition to the rights to which
any owner of a mark is otherwise entitled by this
chapter.62
Section 44(h) states that
1274, 1277 (lth Cir. 2001) (stating that the Paris Convention is not self-
executing because on its face, the Convention provides that it will become
effective only through domestic legislation). But see Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v.
T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 640 (2d Cir. 1956) (stating that plaintiff "would
appear to be correct" in asserting that Paris Convention is self-executing).
61. See, e.g., ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 135 (2d. Cir. 2007);
Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1094 (9th Cir. 2004); MCCARTHY, supra note 3 §
29:4.
62. Lanham Act § 44(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (2006).
2008]
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[a]ny person designated in subsection (b) of this
section as entitled to the benefits and subject to the
provisions of this chapter shall be entitled to
effective protection against unfair competition, and
the remedies provided in this chapter for
infringement of marks shall be available so far as
they may be appropriate in repressing acts of unfair
competition.63
Courts and commentators who believe that sections 44(b) and
44(h) do not provide an action for a famous or well-known mark
suggest that the Lanham Act incorporates the Paris Convention
only to a degree, and that the Paris Convention does not create
substantive rights for foreign nationals beyond those independently
provided in the Lanham Act.' In other words, the Paris
Convention provisions that we see in the Lanham Act only require
that foreign nationals should be given the same treatment in each
member country as that country makes available to its own
citizens.65 This would mean that foreign nationals are given
trademark protection for trademarks that have been used in the
United States, and thus that the Lanham Act does not create
substantive rights for foreign nationals with trademarks that have
not been used within the United States.
However, others have argued that the Lanham Act fully
incorporates Articles 6bis and lObis of the Paris Convention,
giving, through section 43(a), foreign nationals standing to not
only assert a claim under the famous or well-known marks
doctrine, but also to win the suit if their mark is so well-known in
the United States as to make consumer confusion a likely threat. 6
63. Lanham Act § 44(h), 15 U.S.C. § 1126(h) (2006).
64. Int'l Cafe, 252 F.3d at 1277-78.
65. Id. at 1278.
66. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 29:4 (citing Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 645 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981)).
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III. SUBJECT OPINION
A. ITC, Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc.
1. The Facts
In 1977, the plaintiffs, ITC Limited, opened a restaurant called
"Bukhara" in New Delhi, India.67 Since its opening, Bukhara has
become fairly internationally acclaimed, and has been named as
one of the world's fifty best restaurants by London-based
"Restaurant" magazine in 2002 and 2003.68 Hoping to bank off
the success of the New Delhi restaurant, ITC expanded into a
worldwide franchise, with Bukhara restaurants also in Singapore,
Kathmandu, and Ajman.69 In 1986, ITC brought Bukhara into the
United States, opening a restaurant in Manhattan.7" A year later,
ITC entered into franchise agreements to open a Bukhara in
Chicago. 7 At that time, ITC registered the Bukhara mark in
connection with restaurant services in the United States.72 In 1991,
the Manhattan Bukhara closed, and in 1997, the Chicago franchise
was cancelled.73 Since that time, ITC has not owned, operated, or
licensed any restaurant in the United States.74
The defendants, Punchgini and Bukhara Grill II ("Punchgini"),
owned "Bukhara Grill" in New York City, which was incorporated
in 1999."5 Not only had many of the defendants previously
worked for Bukhara in New Delhi, India, but they also had agreed
to "take the name" of Bukhara because there was no longer a
restaurant Bukhara in New York.76 Punchgini's second restaurant,
"Bukhara Grill II", was opened by some of the defendants after the
67. ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2007).
68. Id. at 143 n.4.
69. Id. at 143.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. ITC, 482 F.3d at 143.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 144.
76. Id.
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success of the original Bukhara Grill.77 There were numerous
similarities between the Bukhara restaurant owned by ITC and
Bukhara Grills owned by Punchgini, including similarities in
logos, decor, staff uniforms, wood-slab menus, and red-checked
customer bibs.78
ITC became aware of the operation of the Bukhara Grills in
New York City, and, through their counsel, sent a cease and desist
letter to the defendants on March 22, 2000 demanding that the
defendants refrain from further use of the Bukhara mark.79 On
March 30, 2000, counsel for the defendants responded, hoping to
avoid litigation, but also noting that ITC appeared to have
abandoned the Bukhara trademark by not using it in the United
States for several years.8" Plaintiffs failed to respond to this letter.
Defendants' counsel sent a second letter on June 22, 2000, stating
that, if no response was forthcoming "by June 28, 2000, we will
assume that ITC Limited has abandoned rights it may have had in
the alleged mark and any alleged claim against our client."8
There was no timely reply by the plaintiffs. 82
Roughly two years later, on April 15, 2002, ITC's counsel
renewed their objections to the defendants and complained of the
defendants' failure to respond to the initial letter.83 Defendants
promptly disputed the alleged lack of response, faulted ITC for
failing to reply to the March 22, 2000 letter, and reasserted the
abandonment contention, a position that they claimed was now
bolstered by the passage of additional time.84 Consequently, on
February 26, 2003, ITC filed suit against Punchgini.85
2. Procedural Posture
ITC's lawsuit alleged the following claims: trademark
infringement under section 32(1)(a) of the Lanham Act, unfair
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. ITC, 482 F.3d at 144
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 144-45.
85. ITC, 482 F.3d at 145.
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competition under 43(a), and false advertising under 44(h) of the
Lanham Act.86 ITC also sought relief under common law.87 As an
affirmative defense, Punchgini claimed that ITC had abandoned
the "Bukhara" mark in the United States, and filed a counterclaim
seeking cancellation of the ITC registration.88
The defendants moved for summary judgment and won in the
district court.89  First, the district court ruled that ITC had
abandoned its trademark in the United States, thus, there was no
infringement claim." The district court also held that regardless of
whether the famous marks doctrine applied, "ITC had failed to
adduce sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to conclude
that the name or trade dress of its foreign restaurants had attained
the requisite level of United States recognition to trigger the
doctrine." 1 The court also held that ITC lacked standing to pursue
the false advertising claim.92 ITC appealed to the Second Circuit."3
Initially, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's holding on
federal trademark infringement (agreeing that ITC had abandoned
its mark), affirmed the holding regarding false advertising, and
ultimately decided that there was no federal claim under the
famous marks doctrine since first, the famous marks doctrine was
not expressly included in federal trademark law within the Lanham
Act, and second, the Paris Convention's well-known marks
doctrine had not been written into federal law. 4
In reaching its decision, the Second Circuit first decided that
ITC could not allege a claim under section 43(a) for unfair
infringement because it had abandoned its mark in the United
States.95 The Second Circuit then addressed the territoriality
principle and the viability of the famous marks exception to the
rule. 6 The court addressed Maison Prunier, Vaudable, the TTAB
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. ITC, 482 F.3d at 145
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 142.
95. Id. at 154.
96. Id. at 155.
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decisions, and Grupo Gigante for a case history of the doctrine.97
The Second Circuit found that Maison Prunier and Vaudable were
decided wholly upon New York state common law of unfair
competition, and therefore not applicable to the question of
whether the federal law endorses the famous marks doctrine. 98
While the Second Circuit noted that the decisions of the TTAB are
usually to be given "great weight," the appellate court held that
they were not binding since the TTAB decisions were once again
based wholly on state common law unfair competition.99 Finally,
the Second Circuit looked to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Grupo
Gigante, and once again failed to find adequate support of a
federal famous marks doctrine."'0 Specifically, the Second Circuit
found that the Ninth Circuit had applied the doctrine solely as a
matter of public policy, but that it had not based its holding on any
particular section of federal law or foreign treaty. 101
The Second Circuit handed down the first partial decision in
March of 2007. At that time, the Second Circuit certified the
question of the applicability of the famous marks doctrine under
state law back down to the New York Court of Appeals. 102 The
Second Circuit asked the state court to answer the following
questions: (1) "Does New York common law permit the owner of
a federal mark or trade dress to assert property rights therein by
virtue of the owner's prior use of the mark or dress in a foreign
country?"; and (2) "If so, how famous must a foreign mark be to
permit a foreign mark owner to bring a claim for unfair
competition?"'0 3 The New York Court of Appeals responded in
December of 2007. Finally, in February of 2008, the Second
Circuit addressed the final portion of the appeal, namely whether
there was a famous marks claim available under New York State
law, and if so, whether ITC had sufficiently proven that it held a
97. ITC, 482 F.3d at 157-61.
98. Id. at 157-58.
99. See id. at 159 ("[N]owhere in the three cited rulings does the Trademark
Board state that its recognition of the famous marks doctrine derives from any
provision of the Lanham Act or other federal law.").
100. Id. at 160.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 172.
103. ITC, 482 F.3d at 172.
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famous mark in "Bukhara."' 4
In response to the two certified questions, the New York Court
of Appeals had responded to the first question with a qualified
"yes.""5 Namely, the court stated that they did not recognize the
famous marks doctrine as a separate form of liability, but rather
that their affirmative response was merely a reaffirmation of the
existing state common law theory of unfair competition; i.e.,
"when a business, through renown in New York, possesses
goodwill constituting property or commercial advantage in this
state, that goodwill is protected from misappropriation under New
York unfair competition law. This is so whether the business is
domestic or foreign."' 6
As to the second certified question, the New York Court of
Appeals responded with
Protection from misappropriation of a famous
foreign mark presupposes the existence of actual
goodwill in New York. If a foreign plaintiff has no
goodwill in this state to appropriate, there can be no
viable claim for unfair competition under a theory
of misappropriation. At the very least, a plaintiffs
mark, when used in New York, must call to mind
its goodwill.... Thus, at a minimum, consumers of
the good or service provided under a certain mark
by a defendant in New York must primarily
associate the mark with the foreign plaintiff. '07
The New York Court of Appeals outlined three non-exclusive
factors that may be relevant to the inquiry: (1) intent to associate
goods with those of a foreign plaintiff, manifested by advertising
or public statements; (2) direct evidence, such as consumer
surveys, of public association of goods with those of a foreign
plaintiff; and (3) "evidence of actual overlap between customers of
the New York defendant and the foreign plaintiff.'0 8
104. ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 518 F.3d 159, 160 (2d Cir. 2008).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 161.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 161.
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Specifically, the state court stated that
to prevail against defendants on an unfair
competition theory, under New York law, ITC
would have to show first, as an independent
prerequisite, that defendants appropriated (i.e.,
deliberately copied), ITC's Bukhara mark or dress
for their New York restaurants. If they make that
showing, [ITC] would then have to establish that
the relevant consumer market for New York's
Bukhara restaurant primarily associates the Bukhara
mark or dress with those Bukhara restaurants
owned and operated by ITC. 09
The Second Circuit, in applying the opinion of the New York
Court of Appeals, first found that ITC had in fact showed that
defendants had, by their own admission, deliberately copied the
Bukhara mark. 0
The Second Circuit equated the second prong of the New York
state test with a showing of secondary meaning. "' The Second
Circuit affirmed the district court by holding that ITC "failed to
adduce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material
fact on the question of whether the Bukhara mark, when used in
New York, calls to mind for defendants' potential customers ITC's
goodwill, or that defendants' customers primarily associate the
Bukhara mark with ITC." 12
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Did the Second Circuit Get It Right when It Stated that There Is
No Protection for Famous Foreign Marks Under Federal Law or
Foreign Treaties?
Unfortunately, the ITC decision not only created a circuit split,
109. Id.
110. SeeITC, 518 F.3dat 161.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 163.
[Vol. XIX: 145
20
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 6
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/6
FAMOUS FOREIGN MARKS
but it also seemed to add to the conflagration surrounding the
famous marks doctrine instead of providing abatement. This
comment, as noted in the introduction, proposes that while the
famous marks doctrine should be enumerated in the Lanham Act
and is beneficial on multiple levels, the Second Circuit was correct
in leaving the ultimate decision to Congress.
1. Does the Paris Convention, by Itself, Provide Protection to
Famous Foreign Marks Within the United States?
Part of the contention surrounding the Paris Convention involves
whether or not the treaty is self-executing. If it is self-executing,
the question is, does it create additional substantive protection for
foreign marks? If it is not self-executing and can only find life
within the Lanham Act, how fully has it been incorporated by
Congress into the Lanham Act?
In ITC, the Second Circuit never held that the Paris Convention
was or was not self-executing, but rather held that because
"Bukhara" was a service mark, it was covered by the Trade-
Related Aspects of International Property Rights ("TRIPS"),
which, the court stated, was "plainly not a self-executing treaty."
'1 13
Thus, by way of TRIPS, the court required that any support of the
famous marks doctrine must come through the Lanham Act.
However, the Second Circuit did make note of the Eleventh Circuit
decision, which definitively held that the Paris Convention was not
self-executing based on language of the statute that seems to
require legislation." 4
Some commentators have stated that while most courts have
held that certain sections of the Paris Convention are not self-
executing, those holdings have not been based on any generalized
113. ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 161-62 (2d. Cir. 2007) (citing
In re Rath, 402 F.3d 1207, 1209 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). The TRIPs agreement
became effective on January 1, 1995 and is the dominant international treaty
dealing with intellectual property, including provisions dealing not only with
trademark, but also with copyright and patent. The treaty equates IP rights with
economic rights and allows the same treatment for service marks as is given to
marks distinguishing goods. See generally Lauren Lowe, Note, 9 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 171,172-76 (2006).
114. ITC, 482 F.3d at 161-62; see also Int'l Caf, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Caf6
Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274 (1 lth Cir. 2001).
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principles, but rather have seemingly based their analysis on an
1889 opinion of the United States Attorney General, which stated
that such treaties were not self-executing because they involved
complex issues beyond the expertise and knowledge of foreign
diplomats."5 Other commentators argue that the very text of the
Paris Convention would seem to require the United States to
recognize the famous marks doctrine under 6bis."16 However, both
of these contentions seem to fail in the face of the International
Caft decision, which found that the Paris Convention, on its face,
required domestic legislation in order to become active law within
a certain country." 7
Other commentators suggest that whether or not the Paris
Convention is self-executing, the Paris Convention's famous
marks doctrine had in fact been incorporated into United States
law through certain Lanham Act provisions, such as section 43(a),
section 44(b), and section 44(h)."' Thus, it becomes necessary to
analyze whether these sections actually do incorporate the Paris
Convention as they are currently worded, and as they operate
within the context of federal trademark law.
2. Does the Lanham Act Protect Famous Foreign Marks?
As noted above, some commentators argue that the Lanham Act
incorporates the famous marks doctrine through sections 43(a),
44(b), and 44(h) of Lanham Act." 9 The Second Circuit, in ITC,
quickly cut section 43(a) from the equation in the context of this
case because the plaintiffs had abandoned the mark. 2 ' Therefore,
there was not a thorough discussion of the applicability of the
famous marks doctrine within the context of section 43(a), other
than to briefly note a Southern District of New York case that
115. JAY DRATLER, JR., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COMMERCIAL,
CREATIVE, AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY § 1.09[3] [c] (2007).
116. Prutzman, supra note 8.
117. Int'l Caf6, 252 F.3d at 1277.
118. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 29:4.
119. Id.
120. ITC, 482 F.3d at 154 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co.,
695 F.2d 96, 103 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that where a section 43(a) claim is
based on alleged ownership of a mark, it is necessary to consider "[w]hether the
mark has been abandoned" before considering merits of claim)).
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concluded that rights obtained under the operation of the doctrine
at common law might be asserted in a federal unfair competition
action filed under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.'2 ' The Second
Circuit did not explicitly deny or endorse this proposition.
Commentators that support the proposition that the famous
marks doctrine has been incorporated into the Lanham Act rely on
the language of both the Paris Convention and sections 44(b) and
(h) of the Lanham Act. Specifically, such commentators suggest
that section 44(h) "provides that if a foreign entity is entitled to the
benefits of a treaty such as the Paris Convention, it is entitled to
protection against unfair competition and the remedies provided by
the Lanham Act."' 22
However, sources that are skeptical that the famous marks
doctrine was incorporated into the Lanham Act have either stated
that such a doctrine would have to be explicitly enumerated since
it changed a "bedrock principle of federal trademark law" -
territoriality - or have stringently stuck to the argument that while
the Lanham Act incorporates the Paris Convention, it does not
create additional substantive rights beyond those already provided
in the Lanham Act.'23
It is interesting to note that both the Ninth and Second Circuits
have held that the Paris Convention, as incorporated by the
Lanham Act, does not create any additional substantive rights
other than those provided for by the existing Lanham Act
provisions.' 4 This is a very important distinction. In the simplest
of terms, it means that a foreign national covered by the terms of
the Paris Convention is entitled to the same protections, and only
those protections, that are available to an American citizen in the
United States. With that in mind, it becomes very clear that while
there is protection available to foreign nationals who actually use
their marks within the United States, the same protection - at least
121. Id. at 160 (citing De Beers LV Trademark Ltd. v. DeBeers Diamond
Syndicate, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
122. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 29:4.
123. See Int'l Caf&, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Caf6 Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d
1274, 1277 (1 1th Cir. 2001); Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Market,
Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 324, 326-28 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
124. See ITC, 482 F.3d at 162; Grupo Gigante S.A. De C.V. v. Dallo & Co.,
391 F.3d 1088, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2004).
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with the Lanham Act as it is currently written and interpreted by
the courts - would not be available to foreign nationals who do not
use their marks within the United States. U.S. trademark law
requires that the holder of an unregistered mark demonstrate "use"
within commerce, in addition to likelihood of confusion, mistake,
or fraud before he or she can garner trademark protection under
section 43(a).'25 If a foreign national is provided protection for a
mark that is not actually being used in the United States, the result
would theoretically be substantively superior protection for foreign
national mark-holders than for American mark-holders. This
proposition was nicely explained by the Southern District of New
York in Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Market, Inc.:
[s]ince it is conceded that a United States citizen
who claimed to own the EXITO mark could not
bring a Lanham Act claim for infringement or the
like against the defendants here if he had neither
registered the mark in the United States nor made
prior use of it in the United States, it follows...
that the Second Circuit has effectively concluded
that a foreign owner of an EXITO mark could not
bring such an action either.'2 6
Thus, in the context of ITC, while a strict reading of the Lanham
Act seems counterintuitive and apparently rewards the defendants
for their bad faith use of another entity's mark, if the Lanham Act
does not create additional substantive rights for foreign marks
holders, then the famous marks doctrine cannot apply.
B. If There Should be Protection for Famous Foreign Marks, How
Should the Doctrine be Clarified?
While this comment contends that the Paris Convention is not
self-executing, and that the Lanham Act, as currently written, does
not explicitly include a provision for famous foreign marks absent
use within the United States, this comment does contend that a
famous marks doctrine would be beneficial to a federal trademark
125. Lanham Act § 43(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006).
126. Almacenes Exito, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 328.
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system that must operate in an increasingly global economy. As
noted by the Southern District of New York in De Beers:
[r]ecognition of the famous marks doctrine is
particularly desirable in a world where international
travel is commonplace and where the Internet and
other media facilitate the rapid creation of business
goodwill that transcends borders. One of the
purposes of the doctrine is to protect businesses
from having their goodwill usurped by "trademark
pirates who rush to register a famous mark on
goods on which it has not yet been registered in a
nation by the legitimate foreign owner." Moreover,
given that "avoidance of consumer confusion is the
ultimate end of all trademark law," a doctrine that
prevents consumers from being misled by
trademark pirates is a warranted application of the
Lanham Act, particularly because consumers
themselves cannot sue under Section 43(a). 127
In accordance with the Second Circuit, this comment asserts that
it is not within the federal circuit courts of appeals' discretion to
resolve the United States' treaty agreements. Nor is it within the
discretion of the courts, perhaps even the Supreme Court, to erase
or qualify a principle that is fundamental to trademark law, without
some express legislation by Congress. With that in mind, this
comment proposes that legislation should be enacted by Congress
that implements the famous marks doctrine in limited situations,
such as in cases of clear bad faith, in order to meet our treaty
obligations and encourage trade.
V. IMPACT
The Second Circuit's opinion in ITC could potentially mark a
turning point in federal trademark law. While we are all still
slightly uncertain as to whether the famous marks doctrine applies
127. De Beers LV Trademark Ltd. v. DeBeers Diamond Syndicate, Inc., No.
04 Civ. 4099 (DLC), 2005 WL 1164073, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2005)
(citations omitted).
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to federal trademark law, we are moving closer to a definitive
statement of the law. As it stands, the famous marks doctrine is
recognized in the Ninth Circuit and unrecognized in the Second
Circuit, creating a circuit split that affects not only the United
States, but the world at large.
Legally, we are confronted with the opposing interests of
protecting against unfair competition on an international level, and
the concern of granting superior rights to foreign trademarks than
those that exist for domestic trademarks. Courts and the public
alike will continue to struggle with these competing interests. On
the one hand, it makes sense to protect a foreign trademark that has
become famous within the relevant market in the United States.
After all, fame within the relevant market would imply a high
possibility of confusion for would-be consumers of an infringer's
goods or services. At the same time, fame in a relevant market
would also imply a higher likelihood of bad-faith misappropriation
of a foreign mark.
However, United States trademark law, as noted above, only
recognizes an infringement action when the plaintiff can
demonstrate use in commerce. If, under the Paris Convention,
nationals of member countries are only guaranteed the same level
of protection as is guaranteed to United States citizens, then to
allow them relief under the famous marks doctrine would put them
into direct conflict with the language of the Lanham Act.
Practically, this split indicates possible future certification by the
United States Supreme Court, or, hopefully, action by Congress.
However, this split also creates issues for entities operating both
within the United States and abroad. On the one hand, domestic
entities, unless they are residing in the Second or Ninth Circuits,
still may be unsure of their level of liability to a foreign entity; on
the other hand, foreign entities remain unclear of whether their
marks will be protected from unfair competition within the United
States if they lack registration.
Furthermore, the United States may face repercussions for
failing to honor its treaty obligations, such as failure by other
nations to honor American marks even though they are in use or
registered in that country. Despite these possible complications,
how does Congress resolve such treaty obligations in light of the
more limited rights embodied in the Lanham Act for U.S. citizens?
[Vol. XIX: 145
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And furthermore, if Congress does in fact codify the famous marks
doctrine, it, or the courts, will face challenges in deciding what test
should be used to determine the existence of a famous mark.
These are all questions and concerns that remain unanswered
and they will continue to affect our judicial system and
involvement in international trade. While the Second Circuit
decision has led to a circuit split, perhaps it will also lead us closer
to a final resolution of the issue by the Supreme Court or by
Congress.
VI. CONCLUSION
The state of the famous marks doctrine within federal trademark
law is currently unsettled. The decision in ITC, Ltd. v. Punchgini,
Inc has created a circuit split and a great deal of confusion within
the world of trademark law as to the level of protection afforded to
foreign mark-holders. Considering this confusion, can we expect
the Supreme Court to address the issue in the near future and lay
all of the confusion to rest? While it is possible that the circuit
split will inspire a decision by our highest court, it is more likely,
as this comment argues, more beneficial that Congress explicitly
endorse or reject the doctrine within the Lanham Act.
Specifically, legislation by Congress explicitly supporting or
denying the famous marks doctrine in the Lanham Act would
provide clarity to American citizens and to foreign nationals who
own trademarks and wish to understand the extent of their priority
rights. Furthermore, supportive legislation would ensure that the
United States is fulfilling its treaty obligations, and therefore
encourage reciprocal treatment of U.S. citizens within other
member countries.
While this comment contends that a famous marks doctrine is
good public policy in certain situations, there are valid arguments
on both sides. Regardless of the validity of these arguments, a
conclusion must be made for the public and the courts can rely
upon.
-Kristin Zobel
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